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Introduction
Appellant Marco Fanari, by and through his lawyers D. Gilbert
Athay and Michael R. Sikora, and pursuant to Rule 3 5 of the Utah
Rules of Appellate Procedure, petitions this Court for rehearing in
the above-captioned appeal.

Fanari raised two issues on appeal.

First, he argued that the arresting officer did not have grounds to
conduct a traffic stop for "weaving" in the lane.

Second, Fanari

argued that the arresting officer did not have reasonable suspicion
to extend the scope of the detention to a narcotics investigation.
On December

3,

1998, this

Court

released

an

unpublished

decision, affirming the district court's denial of Fanari's motion
to suppress.

For the reasons outlined in this petition, Fanari

requests this Court to grant the petition for rehearing in order to
revisit his claims for relief under the Fourth Amendment to the
Untied States Constitution.

Argument
1.

The facts surrounding the traffic stop were
not fully addressed by this Court, and such
facts did not justify the initial seizure.

In the memorandum decision [hereinafter "the decision"], this
Court first addressed whether Fanari's driving pattern justified
the traffic stop.

The decision notes that under State v. Bello,

871 P.2d 584, 587

(Utah Ct. App. ) , cert, denied, 883 P.2d 1359

(Utah 1994), "a 'single instance of weaving . . . cannot serve as
the constitutional basis for stopping' a driver for suspicion of
1

driving while impaired, nor for violating Utah Code Ann. § 41-661(1) (1993), which requires drivers to operate their vehicles 'as
nearly as practical' within a single lane.

The decision then

pointed out that the analysis may turn on mitigating circumstances,
and that in Bello the driving pattern could have easily been caused
by extreme wind and the camper shell on the back of the pickup
truck.
However, in the analysis of the facts on appeal, the Court
failed to address the mitigating circumstances in Fanari's case.
First, the arresting officer admitted that Fanari was traveling
directly behind a semi-truck.

(Preliminary Hearing Transcript at

8, 11) [Hereinafter "Trans."]

Second, the officer also conceded

that this occurred a windy day, and in fact that it is almost
always windy on that stretch of highway.

(Trans, at 11)

The decision failed to analyze to what extend these factors
mitigated the driving pattern observed by the arresting officer.
Moroever, the officer's description of the driving pattern was
anything

but

concrete.

For

example,

on

cross-examination

he

admitted that in his police report he stated that Fanari's car "was
weaving from the fog line to the center line."

(Trans, at 9, 10)

The officer also testified that upon approaching Fanari he told
Fanari that the car was going from the fog line to the center line.
(Trans, at 12)

Moroever, this occurred within about twenty to

thirty seconds.

(Trans, at 8 ) .

protracted

driving

pattern,

but
2

The officer did not observe a
rather

he

saw

the

car

move

laterally within its lane over, from fog line to center line, over
a very short stretch of highway.

This happened on a windy day and

Fanari was travelling directly behind a semi truck.
travel

was

"practical"

under

then-existing

Fanari's lane

traffic

and

wind

conditions, especially since the record is at best sketchy about
what

the testifying

officer

actually

saw.

Fanari

requests a

rehearing to more thoroughly flush out the facts relating to the
driving pattern since those facts do not demonstrate that Fanari
violated § 41-6-61(1).

See also United States v. Gregory, 79 F.3d

973 (10th Cir. 1996) ; United States v. Lyons, 7 F.3d 973 (10th Cir.
1993) (both cases analyzed in Appellant's Brief).

2.

The factors relied upon by this Court do not
support a basis to conclude that the officer
had reasonable
suspicion
to extend
the
detention.

First, the decision states that reasonable suspicion was based
at least in part on "peculiar account of the trunk's contents."

In

fact the contents of the trunk was not known until long after the
officer extended the scope of the detention because Fanari did not
provide the officers with his consent to search the trunk.
at 24-25)

(Trans,

Such a finding, then is not supported by the record and

should not have been included in the Court's analysis.
Second, without support in the record the decision states that
Fanari exhibited "extreme nervousness."
State has characterized it that way.
3

In fact, not even the

In its Brief on Appeal, the

State asserted that Fanari was "unusually nervous" during the stop,
and for support cites to pages 14-16 of the preliminary hearing
transcript.

Reviewing those pages of the transcript, the officer

did not describe the quality of nervousness as either "extreme" or
"unusual."

It is inappropriate to characterize a record fact in

terms not supported by the testimony or other evidence, and then
base

a

legal

characterization.
should

not

have

conclusion

in

whole

or

in

part

on

that

Fanari's nervousness was of no consequence and
been

considered

in

the

reasonable

suspicion

calculus.
Third, Fanari's travel plans and the officer's

conclusion

regarding the so-called lack of convergence test are also of no
significance, and were not adequately analyzed in the decision.
Most troubling of all with respect to the rental agreement, travel
plans, and suspicion of DUI is that the investigating officers did
absolutely

nothing

to

confirm

or

dispel

their

suspicion.

Accordingly, Trooper Avery did not even raise the issue of the
alleged suspicious itinerary with Fanari. A fair inference is that
Avery

wanted

to

continue

the

detention,

and

asking

specific

questions may well have resulted in reasonable answers. Reasonable
answers cannot justify reasonable suspicion. The message is clear:
and

officer

is well

advised

to refrain

from making

inquiries

because lack of information will provide the officer with the
requisite fact. Sometimes, the fewer facts available the better it
is for law enforcement.
4

The decision also rests on the conclusion that the officers
had reasonable suspicion that Fanari was driving while impaired or
under the influence.

Again, as in the preceding paragraph, the

officers had no real interest in making further investigations.
After the eye convergence test, nothing else was done to determine
if Fanari was impaired.

No other field sobriety tests were given,

even though there was plenty of time to do so.
cited for DUI.
record

Fanari was never

This is about the integrity of the system.

supports a conclusion

that

the detention was

The

simply a

pretext to search for drugs, and that the factors relied upon, if
closely and thoroughly analyzed, did not justify the detention.

Conclusion
Based upon the foregoing facts and argument, Fanari requests
this Court to rehear his appeal and to closely scrutinize all of
the facts relevant to the issues presented.
DATED this

day of December 1998.

V^MM
D. GILBERT ATHAY
MICHAEL R. SIKORA
Lawyers for Defendant
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)

Certification
Pursuant

to

Rule

35(a)

of

the

Utah

Rules

of

Appellate

Procedure, I HEREBY CERTIFY that this Petition for Rehearing is
presented in good faith and not for the purpose of delay.
DATED this

/ 0 day of December, 1998.

MICHAEL R. SIKORA
Lawyer for Appellant
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this

day of December,

1998.
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day of December, 1998, to:
Kenneth A. Bronston
Criminal Appellate Division
Utah Attorney General's Office
160 East 300 South, #600
P.O. Box 140854
Salt Lake City, UT 84114

/ °

